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Economic Review
Volume 1 No. 3
Long Term Prospects of the Cambodian Economy:
A Quantitative Assessment of the WTO Membership If
Cambodian leaders are quick enough to grab opportunities
provided by the WTO membership to accelerate some critical
reforms, Cambodian people could
be freed from poverty in the
next 10-15 years.
The light in the tunnel will not be necessarily an oncoming
train.
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Based on current trends, Cambodia's economic prospects do
not seem terribly bright as its private sector is not
competitive, corruption is widespread, and governance is weak.
The future of its garment industry, which has been a main
source of economic growth and job creation during the last ten
years, is uncertain in the face of the elimination of the
quota system at the end of 2004. The benefit of the tourism
industry on local livelihoods has remained limited, since
Cambodians do not own high-end assets such as airlines,
hotels, and even airports. Furthermore, natural resources such
as gems and forests have been largely depleted and have ceased
to be a source of substantial income to a large portion of
rural Cambodia. As a result, poverty remains very visible,
especially in rural areas.
In September 2003, however, Cambodia was accepted to become a
member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As a less
developed country (LDC) member, Cambodia could export most of
its products free of tariffs to other WTO members. But these
opportunities will turn into benefits only if the Cambodian
economy is competitive, requiring prompt and serious domestic
reforms. In any case, under the WTO membership agreements,
Cambodia must undertake a large number of reforms, especially
legal reforms. Will Cambodian government be smart and strong
enough to capitalise on the opportunities provided by the WTO
membership to accelerate some critical reforms? To what extent
will these reforms boost economic development and reduce
poverty?
The objective of this article is to identify critical reforms
for sustainable development, and tentatively to quantify its
impacts on the economy. To evaluate these impacts, EIC will
use its modelling system that includes a Computable General
Equilibrium Model, a Provincial Projection Model, and a
Population Projection Model.
Current Critical Issues
After the formation of its first coalition government in 1993,
Cambodia committed itself to wide economic and political
reforms, aiming to transform itself from a socialist country
to a liberal democracy. Some emerging industries, such as the
garment industry, telecommunications and tourism, have become
the engines of economic growth. However, economic development
has been largely confined to urban centres. Little has
trickled down to rural areas.
Low Productivity
Figure 1 clearly shows a correlation between productivity of
worker and the level of stocks of capital. In 2002, stocks of
capital in the agriculture sector, which employs more than 70
percent of Cambodia's labour force, were estimated to amount
to only US$ 240 per worker, generating a modest value added of
US$ 275 per worker (about US$ 0.75 per day). In addition, this
productivity has been on the decline since 1995.
Though it started to slow down in 2001, investment in the
garment sector has been relatively strong during the past
seven years. Productivity of workers in that sector sharply
increased, reaching US$ 2,200 in 2002. However, according to a
recent World Bank study on investment climate in the region,
Cambodia's productivity remains low compared to other
countries, such as China and India. Because the industry faces
huge competition when the quota system is eliminated by 2005,
this study recommends that Cambodia improve its public
governance to support the sector.
Increased joblessness among the young
Cambodia's population figures, devastated during the war
years, have been on a huge increase in these years of relative
peace. Cambodia's labour force totals have been on an
accelerated rate every year since the mid-1990s. This trend
will be stabilised only in the next 15 years. Drawing on
figures in the 1998 census, it is estimated that 230,000 young
people per year will enter the labour market during the early
2000's. However, the number of jobs created during that period
by existing industries will not likely exceed 30,000 per year,
due to decreases in productive investments. This situation
raises great concerns about young unemployment and its
implication on social disturbance.
Based on the current level of land and productivity, Cambodian
agriculture could efficiently support only about one to two
million workers. But currently about 4 million are barely
surviving in this sector. In order to provide employment for
two or three million of young jobless, investments of between
US$ 400 million to US$ 600 million would be needed to improve
worker jobs and prospects in the rural areas. (see Box 1).
|
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Figure1. Productivity and Stocks of
Capital in 2002

Source: EIC,
estimated from various sources |
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Increased landlessness
Landlessness is increasingly recognised as a critical
development issue in Cambodia. According to Oxfam, the number
of landless people in rural areas accelerated during the last
few years. In 1984, landless families amounted to about 3
percent of the total population, slightly lower than that of
1969 - about 4 percent. In 1999, however, this ratio jumped to
about 12 percent, while landlessness among families headed by
single women was even higher - at about 21 percent. Oxfam
expects the trend to get worse in the future.
Policies for Future Development
In short, Cambodia has generated some economic growth, but not
enough to curb growing under-employment and unemployment.
Foreign investment is weak, and Cambodian savings still fly
abroad. Fiscal policy is not yet adequately effective to
support necessary economic and social development programmes.
Landlessness and subsequent migration from rural to urban
areas in search of better economic opportunities is ever
accelerating. Land disputes are widespread. Poverty
alleviation in rural areas is not perceptible.
Institutionally, government power-sharing during the last ten
years has more resembled a money-sharing scheme. State
institutions continue to expand. Corruption is widespread.
Civil service reforms move forward very slowly. Demobilisation
processes do not remain on track.
Facing these challenges, what should development strategy be?
And where do priorities lie?
Restructuring Public Administration
The highest priority is civil service reforms. Economic and
social development cannot be achieved without an accountable
and efficient public sector. Improving good governance and
fighting corruption in public administration are key factors
for rapid and sustainable development in Cambodia. The current
administration is a legacy of years of war. Since the
formation of the first coalition government in 1993, in
conformance with the Paris Peace Agreement signed in 1991,
administrations from different factions (but mainly from the
Cambodian Peoples' Party and Funcinpec Party) have been merged
into a unified administration. In many cases, those staffs
have not been selected in accordance with competency criteria,
but rather on the basis of party loyalty and nepotism,
particularly in the senior ranks. For some lucrative
positions, it seems that the selection has been made in a
corrupt manner as well. Moreover, the whole public
administration is overstaffed, representing almost 7 percent
of the total labour force, which is as much as the whole
manufacturing sector. Salaries for civil servants are so low
that government administration is inevitably inefficient. The
government has recognised these weaknesses and for years has
pledged to make reforms.
Progress has indeed been made in some sections of the civil
service reform, like computerising the registration of civil
servants. But the most difficult tasks are yet to be done -
assessment of the real staffing needs with appropriate
hierarchies and functions, and re-selection of staff. These
assessments should be developed urgently with the
collaboration of different ministries, and with assistance of
donor countries. The selection of core groups of civil
servants will be crucial, and should be made on the basis of
competence within the current pool of civil servants; in some
cases, such as community and social development, the pool
should be expanded to include some non-governmental
organisation (NGO) personnel who have demonstrated their
abilities. Salaries should be raised for the core group staff
to a more liveable level. Staff outside core groups may be
transferred to the Ministry of Social Actions, and will
continue to receive their existing salary for a certain
period.
Military and police reforms should be carried out as
vigorously as those for civil service. In times of peace and
modern technology, having about 130,000 soldiers and 70,000
policemen is simply too extravagant
The real challenge for Cambodia is to transform the surplus
public administration staff into a productive group. Because
the affected personnel are often not well educated, rural
economic development zones should be expanded to assist them
with strict monitoring on management in regard to land
distribution, usage, and cultivation. |
|
Box 1: What workforce size could the Cambodian
agriculture
sector support by providing the workers an earning
at least equal to the poverty line?
To simplify the
calculation, we assume:
1. The value added in the agriculture sector
represents the income of rural people.
2. Size of household = five persons: two
workers -wife and husband- and three dependent
children.
3. Poverty line = US$ 1 income per capita and
per day (World Bank definition), making a total of
US$ 5 per household per day, annualised to US$ 1,825
per household per year.
4. As there are two workers in each family
unit, each worker has to generate an income (or
value added) of US$ 912 (=$1,825/2) per year to
reach the poverty line.
VA: Value Added in agriculture (equal to the income
of rural Cambodian)
W: Income of worker reaching the poverty line (US$
912 per worker per year)
EP: Number of workers earned an income at least
equal to the poverty line
EP = VA/W
According to an EIC
estimate, VA in the agriculture sector (excluding
rubber and forestry) totalled about US$ 975 million
per year during 2001-2003.
So, EP = 975,000,000/912
or EP = 1,070,000 workforces (or say, 1 million)
Remark: If we take
the Cambodia poverty line definition (US$ 0.50 per
day and per capita or 50 percent lower than that of
the World Bank), EP would be roughly two million
workforces. However, criticism has been raised
against the Cambodian poverty line. Critics say that
50 cents per day per person is an extreme poverty
line existence. That amount might buy a minimum to
eat and to wear, but would be insufficient for
sending children to school or paying for health care
when needed.
As a result, Cambodia agriculture could support only
about one (or two) million workers, instead of four
million currently employed. The rural workforce
surplus should be thus between 2 to 3 millions.
Based on various studies on off-farm and non-farm
activities, the capital needed creation of one job
in Cambodian rural small and medium enterprises (SME)
is US$ 200. The capital required for creating 2 or 3
million productive jobs in the rural areas would
thus be US$ 400 to US$ 600 million.
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Implementing and Enforcing the Laws
Private sector development not only requires laws, but also
respect for and enforcement of such laws. Lack of respect for
laws and difficulty in enforcing them are not only a matter of
political will. They are largely connected to the lack of
human and financial resources within the legal system. Legal
reforms and human resource development must go hand-in-hand.
Cambodia has to improve its educational system for its general
population as well as offer specialised education to law
enforcement authorities, like police officers and judges.
Re-adjusting Fiscal Policy
Lessons learned from the experiences of previous years show
that the government is able to substantially, and in a
sustainable manner, raise budget revenues. But first of all,
governance reform should be implemented. Corruption and weak
governance are harmful to budget revenue collections.
According an EIC estimate, smuggling in gasoline alone costs
the national budget lost revenue to the tune of one hundred
million US dollars per year. To prevent this, the EIC
recommends the oil tax policy be readjusted (EIC Economic
Review, Issue 1). To improve revenue collection in the non-tax
areas, it is strongly recommended that the Ministry of Economy
and Finance be the sole authority in charge of monitoring and
collecting revenues. The line ministries should only be in
charge of technical aspects.
Addressing Credit Issues
The Cambodian economy is characterised by the lack of
appropriate credits to the private sector, even though the
currency deposit level has dramatically increased. Statistics
compiled by the National Bank of Cambodia show those credits
from commercial banks to the private sector amount to less
than 50 percent of the total deposits. The rest is mostly sent
abroad. Such a situation is not acceptable, particularly for
Cambodia, where the financing needs for the economy are
extremely urgent. Strengthening the supervision system is, at
this stage, the most crucial. The monetary authority should
also have a clear and active policy on the de-dollarisation of
the economy.
Rethinking Foreign Assistance Priority
The amount of foreign assistance to Cambodia has been very
substantial, and the envy of some other countries during the
past ten years. Many questions, however, have been raised
about its impacts on the people's livelihood. Poverty
alleviation is yet to be visible. So far, a large amount of
foreign aid has been directed to technical assistance.
However, it appears that the severe weakness of Cambodian
public administration has resulted in foreign assistance
having a surprisingly limited effect on structural adjustments
and reforms. As stated above, Cambodia's economic development
cannot be sustainable without restructuring the public
administration and drastically reforming fiscal and monetary
systems. For these reasons, it is crucial that foreign
assistance focus more on the structural adjustment program.
Funds allocated to this program should be strictly earmarked.
To increase the effectiveness of the reforms, transparency in
managing foreign assistance is needed.
The Economic Prospects
To evaluate the impact of economic reforms in Cambodia, EIC
has developed some simulations using a newly-developed
macroeconomic model and database. The simulation includes two
hypothetical scenarios: a Reform Scenario and a
"Laissez-Faire" (or no reform) Scenario. It estimates the
impact of reforms by comparing projected outcomes for the two
scenarios. It should be noted that the scenarios do not
necessarily reflect the entire spectrum of the government's
on-going reforms. Only some reform aspects are included,
primarily for technical reasons. Also, the assumptions made
under each scenario may not precisely match the government's
plans for implementation. |
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Table 1. Main Reform Assumptions
|
Policy measures |
Reform Scenario |
“Laissez-Faire”
Scenario |
|
●
Raising
effectiveness and efficiency of tax collection
●
Improving public services delivery
●
Rationalising
civil administration
●
Demobilise soldiers and policemen
|
●
Increasing budget revenue from 10.7% of GDP in 2003 to
17.5% in 2008, and 18.2% in 2013
●
Decreasing tax
on gasoline and diesel to align their retail prices to
those of neighbouring countries
●
Increasing
monthly salary of civil servants from about US$35 in
2003 to US$100 in 2008, and adjusting to GDP growth
rate from 2008 to 2013
●
Increasing
locally financed public investment, especially
irrigation, schools and health centres in rural area,
from 1.5% of GDP in 2003 to 7.6% in 2008, and keep
this rate up to 2013
●
Increasing
education and health spending from 2.4% of GDP in 2003
to 3.6% in 2008, and 4.5% in 2013
●
Increasing the
number of teachers and health personnel from 103,000
in 2003 to 110,000 in 2008 and 120,000 in 2013
●
Reducing the
number of other civil servants from 60,000 in 2003 to
40,000 in 2008, and retaining this level until 2013
●
Reducing the
number of soldiers and policemen from 185,000 in 2003
to 100,000 in 2008, and keeping this level until 2013 |
●
Budget revenue will remain flat around 11% of GDP
during 2003-2013
●
Keeping tax on gasoline and diesel high
●
Increasing the
monthly salary of civil servants at the same rate as
GDP growth during 2003-2013
●
No additional local funding for investment
●
Keeping education and health spending at the same
percentage of GDP as in 2003
●
Keeping the number of teachers and health personnel
unchanged
● Keeping
the number of other civil servants unchanged
●
Keeping the number of soldiers and policemen unchanged |
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Main Assumptions
The Reform Scenario assumes the government vigorously
implements reforms in the coming five to seven years (Table
1).
In public finance, revenue-enhancing measures increase the
efficiency of tax collection. This enables the government to
increase actual revenues from various sources close to their
potential levels. The government's reforms of civil
administration and military forces comprise many components of
programmes. For the simulation, only three components of
reform programmes are selected: (i) the demobilisation of
soldiers and security officers; (ii) the rationalisation of
civil administration; (iii) an increase of average monthly
salaries of public officials.
Judicial and legal reforms and the development of the private
sector framework provide businesses with a favourable
environment for long-term and large-scale investments. These
reforms also create a level playing field for domestic and
foreign investors. Foreign direct investment expands rapidly,
financial markets are established, and portfolio investment
flows in. The strong commitment of the government to reforms
sends positive signals to foreign donors and aid agencies.
This enables Cambodia to access official grants and loans
necessary to carry out various reforms and development
programmes.
Under the "Laissez-Faire" scenario, the government is assumed
to be unable to translate reform programmes into actions. The
structural problems of governance continue to prevail over the
coming decade.
With regard to the international environment in both
scenarios, we assume that the world economy will continue to
expand during the simulation period, with a growth rate of 4
percent in the US, 3 percent in Europe and 2 percent in Japan.
The Asian economy will conti-nue developing with an average
annual growth rate of 6 percent. Owing to these economic
growths, crude oil price is assumed to fluctuate in the
neighbourhood of $25 per barrel. Commodity prices in the world
markets, such as crops, rubber and timber prices will increase
by about 3 percent a year. Meanwhile, prices of manufactured
goods will rise more moderately - about 2 percent per year -
due to substantial increase in productivities.
Simulation Outcomes
A comparison of outcomes of the two scenarios reveals impact
of reforms on Cambodia's economy in the long run. An overall
conclusion to be drawn from the scenario work is that the
government's reform programmes, if fully implemented, will
have a major positive impact on Cambodia's economy in the
coming two decades.
If the reform programmes are fully implemented in the coming
five to seven years, the real GDP growth rate will accelerate
from 4.5 percent in 2003 to almost 10 percent in the next five
years, before slowing down to around 7.5 percent from 2008 to
2013. This contrasts sharply with the "Laissez-Faire" scenario
in which the growth of real GDP will be hovering around 3
percent per year for the next ten years.
High economic growth stimulated by implemented reforms will
have major implications for the level of people's income.
Nominal GDP per capita will rise from US$ 280 in 2003 to US$
460 in 2008, and US$ 680 in 2013. Due to an increase in
productive investment in rural area, agricultural production
will grow at an annual rate of 5 percent, as compared to a
mere 3 percent in the past ten years. This will have dramatic
and positive impact on poverty reduction, assuming of course
that measures to ensure equitable income distribution - such
as rural development and social welfare programmes - are also
in place.
By contrast, the picture will be gloomy for a Cambodia without
reforms. With modest economic growth, nominal GDP per capita
will be US$ 330 in 2008, and US$ 400 in 2013. No significant
changes will occur in income in real terms, putting on hold
any hope for poverty alleviation. |
|
Figure 2. GDP per Capita Projection

Source: EIC
Projection |
|
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Concluding Remarks
The real determination of Cambodian leaders to move their
country forward as a civilized and developed country, with
rule of law and a sustainable economic development strategy,
is best reflected in the outcomes of the "With Reform"
Scenario. The rule of law means there is real reform of the
judicial system, police force, and the army. A sustainable
economic development strategy includes a drastic fiscal and
monetary reforms, better natural resource management, and good
governance with civil administration reform and
decentralization.
By successfully implementing these primary reforms, the
Cambodian administration will become more efficient and
effective. Cambodia will be able to mobilize what it needs in
terms of investments and savings, externally and internally,
to develop the country. Economic growth will be strong enough
to offer new entrants into the labour market opportunities to
be economically productive. Foreign reserves will grow
steadily, helping prevent severe volatility in the exchange
rates. Inflation rate will remain low, and the Cambodian
economy will be increasingly competitive in the world markets.
With the rule of law and strong macro-economic stability, a
stock market can be introduced and developed rapidly. The
banking and other financial systems that are the main factors
in mobilising private savings will thus be revived and
strengthened. Long-term private investment will be
forthcoming. Income will increase sharply; and basic
infrastructures - physical, economic, and social - will be
rehabilitated or rebuilt in about 7 to 10 years. The core
economic policy aiming at alleviating the poverty of the
Cambodian people will be achieved.
Sok Hach
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